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A FREE PASS FOR CORPORATE
CONSPIRATORS?: INCONSISTENT
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CORPORATE CONSPIRATORIAL LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The act of incorporating a business allows the resulting corporation
to be viewed as a single entity in the eyes of the law.' Individual agents of
the corporation acting within the scope of their professional capacities and
in furtherance of corporate objectives are considered a part of this legal
entity. 2 The notion of this single fictitious "person" created by the act of
incorporation has resulted in troublesome conceptual discrepancies in the
area of civil and criminal corporate conspiratorial liability.3 The essence of
a conspiracy charge is that two or more persons - a plurality of individuals
- have agreed to engage in illegal conduct. 4 Therefore, in a corporate
context, the multiplicity of actors necessary to constitute a conspiracy is
negated because the corporation and its agents are viewed as a single legal
actor.
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine developed in response to
the question of whether a corporation is capable of conspiring with its own
agents. 6 The doctrine concludes that because it is not legally possible for
an individual to conspire with himself, it is also not legally possible for a
single entity consisting of a corporation and its agents to conspire with

I See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970 (l ith Cir. 1982) ("Under elementary
agency principles, a corporation is personified through the acts of its agents.").
2 See id.; see also Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981)
(noting agent's acts are attributed to corporation and are those of single legal actor).
3 See Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C § 1985(c): The Impact of Novotny v.
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association, 13 GA. L. REV. 591, 598-99 (1979)
[hereinafter IntracorporateConspiracies](recognizing a corporation, in the eyes of the law, is "a
single fictive person"). Agents working on behalf of the corporation, though multiple in number,
still act as a single entity and thus are incapable of conspiring with each other. Id. at 600.
4 See JOSEPH F. MCSORLEY, A PORTABLE GUIDE TO FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW:
DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES 14 (American Bar Association 1996)

(outlining conspiracy elements).
5 See Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 603 (stating rationale for conspiracy rule).
6 See I KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A TREATISE ON THE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS AND AGENTS 266 (Clark, Boardman

& Callaghan, 2d ed. 1992) (explaining intracorporate conspiracy doctrine's purpose).
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Although the doctrine originated in the antitrust context, federal

courts have considered its applicability in the contexts of civil conspiracies
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and criminal conspiracies under 18 U.S.C. § 371. s
The majority of circuit courts have allowed the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine defense to civil conspiracy claims filed under § 1985, employing
precisely the same reasoning concerning the absence of the plurality of
actors requirement as applied in antitrust litigation. 9 A small number of
circuit courts, however, have refused to allow the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine defense in § 1985 civil conspiracy claims because the doctrine was
conceived for use in an entirely different and unrelated context.' 0 The
doctrine was never intended to shield corporations from liability for
conspiring to violate an individual's civil rights." For seemingly similar
reasons, every court that has addressed the application of the intracorporate
exception to criminal conspiracies in violation of § 371 has ruled that the
doctrine cannot be extended as a liability shield for corporate criminal
activity. 12
In contrast, no such uniformity exists among the circuit courts in
the context of civil conspiracies, even though the doctrine was also not
originally intended to act as a shield against liability for conspiring to

7 See Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952)
(reasoning it is an "absurd assertion" that defendant corporation conspired with itself). Before
Nelson, there was little federal case law that addressed this issue. See BRICKEY, supra note 6, at
266 (outlining intracorporate conspiracy doctrine's development).
8 See generall' Milton Handler & Thomas A. Smart, The Present Status of the
Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23, 23-26 (1981-82) (reviewing
doctrine's origin and it role in antitrust litigation); Lawrence C. McQuade, Conspiracy,
MulticoiporateEnterprises, andSection 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REV. 183, 183-84 (1955)
(explaining rationale behind an intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in antitrust context). 42
U.S.C. § 1985 prohibits civil conspiracies to interfere with an individual's civil rights in three
distinct ways: § 1985(1) states that "two or more persons" cannot conspire to prevent an officer
from performing his duties; § 1985(2) states that "two or more persons" cannot conspire to
obstruct justice by intimidating a party, witness, or juror, or to injure a person or his property for
lawfully enforcing or attempting to enforce the right of any person to the equal protection of the
laws; and § 1985(3) states that "two or more persons" cannot conspire to deprive persons of their
rights or privileges. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2000). The federal criminal conspiracy statute makes it
illegal for "two or more persons" to conspire to commit any offense against the United States. 18
U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
9 See in/ia note 44 and accompanying text (listing circuit holdings in regard to intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine as applied to civil conspiracy claims).
10 See cases cited infra note 49 and accompanying text (listing First, Third, and Tenth Circuit
holdings).
II See cases cited infra note 49 and accompanying text (identifying minority courts'
reasonings).
12 See cases cited infra note 82 and accompanying text (explaining doctrine's applicability to
criminal conspiracies).
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violate one's civil rights.' 3 This Note seeks to discern why the circuit
courts have failed to adequately address the reasons for drawing a
distinction between civil and criminal corporate conspiratorial liability. 4
Furthermore, it purports that if the doctrine's original intent serves as the
courts' sole basis for refusing to extend the doctrine as a defense in
criminal conspiracy claims, then it logically follows that there should be no
15
split among the circuit courts as to its applicability in civil conspiracies.
This reasoning follows because the doctrine was only intended to eliminate
corporate liability in an antitrust context. 16 Part II traces the origin and
development of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in light of basic
agency principles and the need to protect corporations from certain types of
liability under the Sherman Antitrust Act.' 7 It also discusses the current
circuit split regarding the application of the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine to civil conspiracy claims, the uniform refusal among circuit
courts to apply the doctrine as a defense to criminal conspiracies, and the
Eleventh Circuit's unique attempt to reconcile the current inconsistencies.18
Part III applauds the Eleventh Circuit's logical approach and asserts that, at
the very least, the majority of courts that have failed to recognize the many
arguments against allowing the intracorporate conspiracy defense in civil
claims should consider adopting the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning. 9 It
further concludes, however, that the reasoning provided by the Eleventh
Circuit, like the reasoning of the majority of other circuits, fails to
adequately address why a distinction exists between corporate civil and
criminal conspiratorial liability.20 Accordingly, the distinction should be
reconsidered. 2'

13 See infra notes 44, 49, and 82 and accompanying text (summarizing jurisdictional
differences).
14 See infra Part III(C) (addressing stated question).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 123-125 (stating author's conclusion).
16 See infra Part II(B)(2) (outlining intracorporate conspiracy doctrine's development).
17 See infra Parts II(A) and (B).
18 See infra Parts II(C-E); see also McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031,
1034 (1lth Cir. 2000) (drawing parallel between civil and criminal conspiracies arising from
same activity). The court held that "just as the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine cannot shield a
criminal conspiracy from prosecution under the federal criminal code, the doctrine cannot shield
the same conspiracy, alleging the same criminal wrongdoing, from civil liability arising under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2)." Id The Eleventh Circuit recognized that a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(2), alleging a conspiracy to deter an individual from testifying in federal court by force,
intimidation, or threat, necessarily alleges both criminal activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512,
the criminal statute prohibiting tampering with a witness, and a criminal conspiracy in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id.
'9 See infra Part III(A).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 118-120.
21 See infra Part IV (providing author's conclusion).
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II.

A.

HISTORY

Basic Agency Principles

The Supreme Court described a corporation as "an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being a
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of

its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence."2 2 The act of incorporation creates a seemingly immortal
fictitious being whose existence is potentially infinite, despite changes in
individual leadership behind the corporation.23 Individual agents of the
corporation who act within the scope of their professional capacities and in

furtherance of corporate objectives are considered a part of this legal entity
and thus afforded broad immunity from any personal liability for
misdeeds.24 Courts will only pierce this corporate veil of liability and hold
individual actors personally liable in very rare instances, usually when

there is evidence of intermixture of affairs, lack of corporate formalities, or
inadequate capitalization.25

22 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
23 See id (explaining legal result of incorporation). The Woodward Court stated in relevant
text, "[a]mong the most important [corporate properties] are immortality, and, if the expression
may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are
considered as the same, and may act as a single individual." Id.
24 See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 970 (1 th Cir. 1982) (recognizing "[u]nder
elementary agency principles ... the acts of its agents become the acts of the corporation ....");
see also Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting agents' acts
all attributed to corporation as a single legal actor).
25 See Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222, 1230 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (refusing to
recognize corporate entity due to lack of corporate formalities). The court noted, "[a] failure to
observe corporate formalities coupled with inadequate capitalization has frequently been cited as
a basis for disregarding the corporate entity... " Id. Furthermore, any attempt to do corporate
business without providing sufficient assets to meet corporate responsibilities to creditors is an
abuse of the corporate privilege and grounds for piercing the corporate veil. See Minton v.
Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (Cal. 1961) (finding liability when corporate agents made no attempt
to provide adequate capitalization). Courts will also pierce the corporate veil if there is evidence
of intermixture of affairs. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8-9 (N.Y. 1966) (imposing
individual liability only if company is instrumentality for carrying on stockholder's business).
The company is simply an instrumentality without imposing upon it other responsibilities
incidental to operation of the business. Id.at 8. An intermixture of affairs refers to the "blurring
of the distinction between the concerns of the corporation and those of its owners." ARTHUR R.
PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 42 (Bender & Co., 2004).
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Elements of Conspiracy

A conspiracy is traditionally defined as "an agreement between two

or more persons to achieve an unlawful object or to achieve a lawful object
by unlawful means." 26 According to the Supreme Court, the plurality
element of a conspiracy charge represents a "distinct evil." 27 This stems

from the idea that two people who agree to commit a crime create a more
dangerous threat to society than one or both of them planning to commit
not criminally
the same offense independently. 28 A civil conspiracy, while
29
punishable, contains the same plurality of actors element.

2.

Doctrinal Development in an Antitrust Context

The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine developed in response to
the question of whether a corporation is capable of conspiring with its own
agents.3 ° In Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.,3 1 the Fifth
Circuit was the first court to announce the doctrine. The court concluded

26 See Douglas G. Smith, Comment, The IntracorporateConspiracy Doctrine and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3): The OriginalIntent, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1170(1996) (defining "conspiracy").
27 See United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274-75 (2003) (quoting Salinas v.
United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997)).
28 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). In
his concurrence, Justice Jackson stated "the strength, opportunities and resources of many is
obviously more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer." Id.
Moreover, purported dangers in collective criminal activity include unlikelihood of a person
abandoning his or her criminal plans because of fear or loyalty to co-conspirators. See Jiminez
Recio, 537 U.S. at 275 (recognizing danger remains if co-conspirators do not abandon
conspiracy). The Jiminez Recio Court noted that the combination of individuals "decreases the
probability that [they] will depart from their path of criminality." Id. (quoting Callanan v. United
States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961)). Group criminality also makes it possible to commit more
elaborate crimes, and the "[c]ombination in crime makes more likely the commission of crimes
unrelated to the original purpose for which the group was formed." Callanan, 364 U.S. at 59394.
29) See Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1206 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984)
(defining civil conspiracy). A civil conspiracy is defined as "a combination of two or more
persons by an agreement or understanding to accomplish an unlawful act or to use unlawful
means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal, with the further requirement that the act or the
means employed must result in damages to the plaintiff." Id. (citing Green v. Wash. Sub. San.
Comni'n, 296 A.2d 815, 824 (Md. 1970)).
30 See BRICKEY, supra note 6, at 266 (outlining intracorporate conspiracy doctrine's
development).
31 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
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that because it was not legally possible for an individual to conspire with
himself, it was also not legally possible for a single entity consisting of a
corporation and its agents to conspire with itself.32 The court found that
-[i]t is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or
entities to have a conspiracy ... and it is the general rule that the acts of the
agent are the acts of the corporation." 33 In Nelson Radio and its progeny,

the defense of intracorporate conspiracy was utilized in an antitrust context
because courts found it logical to conclude that a single corporation could
not conspire with itself to restrain trade in the way imagined by Section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.34
In addition to conspiracies between corporations and their agents,
courts have also considered whether a conspiracy can exist between a
parent corporation and its subsidiaries in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.35 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.,36 where it held that a conspiracy for the
purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act is not possible between
The Court
a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary.37
reasoned that a parent corporation and its subsidiary "have a complete unity

of interest," with common objectives and corporate actions that are "guided
32 Id. at 914 (reasoning it is an "absurd assertion" that defendant corporation conspired with
itself). The court noted that the complaint did not name the individual officers and agents
separately. Id. Nevertheless, the court went on to state that "the inclusion of the defendant's
agents in the alleged conspiracy would seem to be only the basis for a technical rather than a
substantial charge of conspiracy because obviously the agents were acting only for the defendant
corporation." Id. (quoting Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824, 830 (D.C. Md.
1937).
33 Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914.
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states that "[elvery
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
Section 1 "does not purport to cover a conspiracy which consists merely in the fact that the
officers of the single defendant corporation did their day to day jobs in formulating and carrying
out its managerial policy." Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914. A single corporation can, on the other
hand, act in violation of Section 2 of the Act because the statute simply prohibits attempts to
monopolize. Id. While a single corporation can monopolize, it cannot alone form a contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade so as to violate Section 1 of the Act. Id.; see also
Smith, supra note 26, at 1175 (emphasizing corporate liability distinction existing between
Sections 1 and 2 of Sherman Antitrust Act). The corporate liability distinction between the two
sections of the Act is how the doctrine came to light in an antitrust context. See Handler &
Smart, supra note 8 (reviewing origin of doctrine and its role in antitrust litigation); McQuade,
supra note 8 (explaining rationale behind "intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine" in antitrust
context).
35 See Smith, supra note 26, at 1175-78 (noting intracorporate issue arises in context of
conspiracies between parent corporation and its subsidiaries).
36 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
37 Id. at 777.
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The Court

recognized that the corporate form chosen by the corporation should not

dictate whether it is subject to antitrust liability. 39 Therefore, a corporation
should not be penalized simply because it chose to adopt the subsidiary
form of organization in order to "serve efficiency of control, economy of
operations, and other factors dictated by business judgment without

increasing its exposure to antitrust liability. ' '4°
C.

Application of the IntracorporateConspiracyDoctrine to Civil
ConspiracyClaims

1.

Statutory Basis Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985

42 U.S.C. § 1985 applies to alleged conspiracies to interfere with
an individual's civil rights.4 1 It prohibits these types of conspiracies in

three distinct ways: § 1985(1) states that "two or more persons" cannot
conspire to prevent an officer from performing his duties; § 1985(2) states
that "two or more persons" cannot conspire to obstruct justice by
intimidating a party, witness, or juror, or to injure a person or his property
for lawfully enforcing or attempting to enforce the right of any person to
the equal protection of the laws; and § 1985(3) states that "two or more
persons" cannot conspire to deprive persons of their rights or privileges.4 2
Courts and legal commentators have repeatedly addressed whether the
application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to claims arising under
this statute is analogous to its application in an antitrust context.43
38 Id.at 771. The Copperweld Court stated that "a rule that punishe[s] coordinated conduct
simply because a corporation delegated certain responsibilities to autonomous units might well
discourage corporations from creating divisions with their presumed benefits. This would serve
no useful antitrust purpose but could well deprive consumers of the efficiencies that decentralized
management may bring." Id.
39 Id. at 772-73 (stating "intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine looks to the form of an
enterprise's structure and ignores the reality.").
40 Id. at 773. The Court reasoned that "[i]f antitrust liability turned on the garb in which a
corporate subunit was clothed, parent corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries
into unincorporated divisions. . . .Such an incentive serves no valid antitrust goals but merely
deprives consumers and producers of the benefits that the subsidiary form may yield." Id.at 77374.
41 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2000).
42 Id.
43 See Smith, supra note 26, at 1178-79 (explaining proposed "antitrust analogy").
According to Smith, the purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and § 1985 are
identical. Id. The Sherman Act "is designed to prohibit conspiracies to deprive individuals of
their right to engage in free trade," while § 1985 is "designed to prohibit certain conspiracies to
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2.

Majority Rulings

The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C.
Circuits have allowed the intracorporate conspiracy defense in civil
conspiracy claims filed under § 1985. 44 Employing precisely the same
reasoning as applied in antitrust litigation, these courts focus on the idea
that because the "acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation," the

individual actors or the corporation itself cannot be considered separate
entities that join forces to conspire to commit a civil wrong.45 These courts
deny individuals of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws." Id. Smith points to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Travis v. Gary Community
Mental Health Center, Inc., 921 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1990), in which the court acknowledged that
the antitrust reasoning could be applied to § 1985(3) claims. Smith, supra note 26, at 1180.
According to the Seventh Circuit, "the antitrust laws aim at preserving independent economic
decisions, which supposes cooperation inside economic entities - cooperation that cannot be
called 'conspiratorial' without defeating the foundation of competition." Travis, 921 F.2d at 110.
The court reasoned that such a purpose is congruous with that of § 1985, which "aims at
preserving independent decisions by persons or business entities, free of the pressure that can be
generated by conspiracies .... " Id.
44 See Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding corporation cannot
be held liable for civil conspiracy). The court reached its conclusion by applying the idea that
"the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation." Id. (quoting Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952)); Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 1991) (dismissing terminated employee's §
1985(3) claim). The court reasoned that "[s]ince all of the defendants are members of the same
collective entity, there are not two separate 'people' to form a conspiracy." Id.; Buschi v. Kirven,
775 F.2d 1240, 1251 (4th Cir. 1985) (dismissing § 1982(2) claim by group of discharged
whistleblowers). The court in Buschi concluded that there was no conspiracy because the
"officers or employees of the same firm do not provide the plurality of actors imperative for a ...
conspiracy." Id. at 1252 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
768 (1984)); Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding dismissal of
Brooklyn Law School faculty member). The court upheld the dismissal despite the faculty
member's § 1985(2) claim because the school "is admittedly an educational corporation" and all
those involved in the termination decision were acting in that capacity. Id.; Baker v. Stuart
Broad. Co., 505 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1974) (dismissing sex-discrimination § 1985(3)
complaint). In Baker, the court dismissed the complaint because the act was that of a single
business entity and therefore was not an actionable conspiracy cognizable under the statute. Id.;
Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972) (finding no conspiracy when two
executives of the same firm made a business decision). In Dombrowski, the court ruled that a
decision to discriminate in furtherance of the business's purpose cannot be categorized as a
conspiracy for purposes of § 1985(3). Id.; Tabb v. Dist. of Columbia, 477 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191
(D. D.C. 2007) (dismissing § 1985(2) claim). The court dismissed the claim because the
defendant corporate agents were acting within the scope of their employment and therefore were
not seen as separate and distinct entities. Id. at 190-91.
45 See e.g., Hilliard,30 F.3d at 653 (applying holding in Nelson Radio). There were not two
or more people to form a conspiracy because all members were part of the same collective entity.
Id; Hull, 926 F.2d at 509 (adopting general rule that "a corporation cannot conspire with its own
agents or employees"); Baker, 505 F.2d at 183 (finding no conspiracy). The plurality of actors
requirement "is not satisfied by proof that a discriminatory business decision reflects the
collective judgment of two or more executives of the same firm." Id. (quoting Donbrowski,459
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have also recognized, however, that such a defense should only be applied
when the individual agents are acting within the scope of their corporate
d
capacities. 46
The decisions that apply the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine to civil conspiracies do not readily distinguish between the
doctrine's application in an antitrust context and in a claim under § 1985. 47
Rather, some decisions simply recognize that despite the fact that the
doctrine developed in an antitrust context, "the same rule has been
consistently applied in allegations of conspiracy under the Civil Rights
Act." 4
3.

Minority Rulings

The First, Third, and Tenth Circuits refuse to allow the
49
intracorporate conspiracy defense to § 1985 civil conspiracy claims.
These circuits reason that the doctrine is inapplicable because it was

conceived for use in an antitrust context and was not intended to provide
impunity for corporations and corporate agents that conspired to violate an
individual's civil rights. 50 The Third Circuit was the first to diverge from
the popularly held judicial ruling that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
was as equally applicable in a civil conspiracy context as in an antitrust

F.2d at 196).
46 See Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196 (reasoning two or more executives acting within their
official capacities constitutes single corporate business decision). The Dombrowski court,
however, "do[es] not suggest that an agent's action within the scope of his authority will always
avoid a conspiracy finding." Id. The court illustrated this assertion by further stating that
members of the Ku Klux Klan could not avoid liability for committing acts of violence pursuant
to orders executed by the Grand Dragon. Id.
47 See Doherty v. Am. Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Nelson
Radio,
200 F.2d at 914). The Sixth Circuit employed Nelson Radio as the basis for the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine's applicability to both antitrust litigation and civil conspiracy claims. Id.; see
also Herrmann, 576 F.2d at 459 (applying intracorporate conspiracy doctrine). Herrmann
involved a § 1985(2) claim where the plaintiff alleged a race-based conspiracy to terminate his
employment as a professor at Brooklyn Law School. Id. at 454.
48 See Dohert,, 728 F.2d 334, 339 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914).
49 See Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine's original purpose). The court stated that "the doctrine,
designed to allow one corporation to take actions that two corporations could not agree to do,
should not be construed to permit the same corporation and its employees to engage in civil rights
violations." Id. at 1127; Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting
intracorporate conspiracy exception not so broad as to apply to civil conspiracies); Novotny v.
Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1257 (3d Cir. 1978) (reasoning there was no
benefit gained by immunizing corporate criminal activity). The Novotny court stated that in terms
of discriminatory action in violation of § 1985(3), "we can perceive no function to be served by
immunizing such action once a business is incorporated." Id. (citing First, Third, and Tenth
Circuit holdings).
50 See cases cited supra note 49 (explaining First, Third, and Tenth Circuit holdings).
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In Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings and Loan
context. €'
Association,'2 a former director of the defendant corporation sued his
employer and certain directors and officers pursuant to § 1985(3). 53 The
director alleged that he was terminated because he supported a female
employee who claimed she suffered sexual discrimination at the hands of
the corporation. 54 The district court dismissed the complaint because it
held that the termination was "a single act ... by a single business entity,"
and therefore lacked the foundation for a conspiracy claim. 55 The Third
Circuit, however, reversed, reasoning that because Novotny named
individual officers in his complaint rather than the corporation, he had
alleged sufficient facts to support a finding of conspiracy.56 Novotnv,
therefore, appears to stand for the proposition that individual officers and
agents are never immune from conspiratorial liability, even when acting
Furthermore, the Novotny
within the scope of their official capacities.
that
the
reasoning behind the
to
suggest
court's holding seems
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine - that it is impossible for a corporation
to conspire with itself- is only a legitimate defense when the plaintiff
Even in such a
names the corporate entity as one of the conspirators.exempt from
are
not
situation, however, the individual agents and officers
59
liability.
Novotny also recognizes the idea that an unlawful action
undertaken by members of an unincorporated partnership cannot be
deemed protected from conspiratorial liability simply because the business
decides to incorporate. 60 According to the court, "[i]f, as it seems clear
51 See Intracor)orateConspiracies. sulpra note 3, 612-613 (1979) (commenting on Third
Circuit's reasoning). "The Third Circuit abandoned the uncertain factual distinctions that have
plagued courts" in their application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Id. at 612; see also
Novotnv, 584 F.2d at 1258 (examining legal effect of concerted corporate action). The Third
Circuit held that "concerted action by officers and employees of a corporation, with the object of
violating a federal statute, can be the basis ofa § 1985(3) complaint." Id.
52 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978).
53 Id. at 1238 (listing Novotny's allegations).
54 Id. at 1238 (stating case facts).
Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 227, 229-30 (W.D. Pa.
1977), revd, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978).
56 Noiotny, 584 F.2d at 1257-58 (explaining circuit court's holding). The court noted that
due to the complaint's structure, this case was "no occasion to evaluate the force of the
proposition that a corporation cannot conspire with itself." Id. at 1258.
57 See IntracorporateConspiracies,sq)ra note 3,at 614 (analyzing policy impact of court's
decision).
58 See id. (explaining implications of Novotnyl decision on corporate liability).
59 See id. at 613-14 (theorizing court's decision prohibits other courts from applying doctrine
in same way).
60 Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1257 (noting statute does
not seek to protect such unlawful actions).
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under § 1985(3), the agreement of three partners to use their business to
harass any blacks who register to vote constitutes a conspiracy, we can
perceive no function to be served by immunizing such action once a
business is incorporated." 61 As such, the court saw no reason to protect
the alleged action simply because the individual agents were acting on
behalf of a single corporate entity under the law.62
The few circuit courts that have refused to apply the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine to civil conspiracy claims also devote a substantial
portion of their analysis to emphasizing a distinction between a conspiracy
in the antitrust context and a conspiracy to violate an individual's civil
rights.63
In Stathos v. Bowden,64 the First Circuit noted that the
intracorporate conspiracy exception should not be read so "broadly" as to
extend to corporate conspiracies to violate an individual's civil rights
because the considerations that led to the doctrine's establishment in the
antitrust field were significantly different.65 Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act seeks to quell the evil that arises when two separate
enterprises join to act in restraint of trade (e.g., fixing prices).66 In a
competitive marketplace, the same action taken separately by individual
corporations as a result of "joint decision-making by managers within 67a
single enterprise" is less harmful and even "legitimately socially useful.
The court noted, however, that in equal protection claims "one cannot
readily distinguish in terms of harm between the individual conduct of one
enterprise and the joint conduct of several., 68 As such, the boundaries of
the intracorporate conspiracy exception should
be narrower in equal
69
protection claims than in antitrust situations.

61 Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 1257-58 (explaining court's reasoning).
63 See Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
doctrine's origin was in no way related to civil conspiracies); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 21
(1st Cir. 1984) (noting distinction between civil conspiracies and antitrust cases); Novotnv, 584
F.2d at 1258 (distinguishing between antitrust and civil rights cases).
64 728 F.2d 15 (lst Cir. 1984).
65 See id. at 20-21; see also Handler & Smart, supra note 8, at 72-73 (examining doctrine's
origin and role in antitrust litigation); McQuade, supra note 8, at 185 (explaining why
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine exists in antitrust context).
66 See Stathos, 728 F.2d at 21 (stating purpose of Section 1 of Sherman Antitrust Act).
67 Id.(distinguishing between act by single corporation and act undertaken by two businesses
joined together). The legitimate social use refers to fostering healthy competition in the free
marketplace, a purpose that is negated when two corporations conspire in restraint of trade. See

id.
68 Id. (noting difference between antitrust and equal protection cases in terms of resulting
harm). The court also noted that such action is not made more desirable when multiple officers of
a single enterprise decide to act. Id.
69 See id.
(stating court's conclusion).
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Similarly, in Novotny, the Third Circuit reasoned that the
.,economic efficiencies and pro-competitive effects" set forth as
justifications for the intracorporate conspiracy exception in antitrust
litigation do not have viable counterparts in the civil rights field.70 There is
no analogous defense that "would protect a conjuration to deprive a
The Tenth Circuit adopted Novotny's
minority of equal rights.'
reasoning in Brever v. Rockwell InternationalCorp.v2 In Brever, plaintiffs
claimed that they were terminated after cooperating with the FBI by
providing testimony in an investigation regarding potential environmental
crimes committed by their employer.7 3 In dealing with the § 1985(2) claim,
the court refused to allow "the doctrine, designed to allow one corporation
to take actions that two corporations could not agree to do . . . [to] be
construed to permit the same corporation and its employees to engage in
civil rights violations." 74
Legal scholars have also pointed to the premise that a corporation
that acts through its agents "poses all the dangers of a prototypical
conspiracy. 7 5 This notion is founded upon the rationalization that an
agreement by persons to achieve a certain end produces a greater likelihood
that the offense will be committed.76 In such situations, "the view of the
corporation as a single legal actor becomes a fiction without a purpose"
because the collective action by individual agents of a corporation "creates
the 'group danger' at which conspiracy liability is aimed." 77 Furthermore,
it is established that corporate agents are held primarily liable, and the
corporation itself derivatively liable, when the agents commit tortious acts
while acting within the scope of their employment.7 8 It has been argued
that such primary and derivative liability is no different than holding
corporate agents liable for conspiring while acting within the scope of their
70 Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1257-58 (3d Cir. 1978)
(explaining court's reasoning).
Id. at 1258 (recognizing doctrine's justifications as inappropriate in civil rights context).
I1
72 40F.3d 1119(10thCir. 1994).
73 Id. at 1123 (stating case facts).
74 Id. at 1126-27 (explaining court's holding).
75 See Intracorporate Conspiracies, supra note 3, at 617 (detailing reasoning behind
conspiracy laws); see also supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing reasons collective
action poses distinct threat).
76 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (listing unique dangers associated with
collective unlawful action).
77 Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 603 (5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit
did not adopt this reasoning, but simply explained the alternative reasoning set forth by various
other courts. Id.; see also Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies under 42 U.S.C. .§ 1985(c), 92
HARV. L. REv. 470, 478-79 (1978) (explaining need for conspiracy liability in corporate setting).
79 See Intracorporate Conspiracies, supra note 3, at 616-17 (discussing corporate versus
individual liability when tortious acts are committed in the workplace).
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Holding corporate agents liable for conspiracy "would

attach no greater burden to the attribute of incorporation than do the other
forms of tort liability that.., have [been] applied to corporate agents."80
D.

Application of the IntracorporateConspiracy Doctrine to Criminal
Conspiracies

18 U.S.C. § 371 of the Federal Criminal Code makes it illegal for
"two or more persons" to conspire to commit any offense against the
United States. 8'

Every court that has addressed the application of the

intracorporate exception to criminal conspiracies has ruled that the doctrine
cannot be extended to criminal activity undertaken by multiple agents of a
single corporation.8 2 These rulings were reached regardless of each court's
respective holding regarding a distinction, if any, between the applicability

of the doctrine in an antitrust versus a civil rights context.83 The relevant
courts did not provide extensive reasoning for these holdings.8 4 In United
States v. Wise,8 5 the Supreme Court stated that "the fiction of corporate
entity ... has never been applied as a shield against criminal prosecutions.

79 See id (questioning whether public policy supports protecting corporate agents from

liability for conspiracy).
") id. at 617.
X18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
82 See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 417 (1962) (recognizing "the fiction
of corporate
entity ... had never been applied as a shield against criminal prosecution .... "); United States v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating it was "illogical" to apply doctrine
to criminal conspiracies); United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1990)
(noting a corporation can be convicted of conspiring with its officers); United States v. Hugh
Chalmers Chevrolet-Toyota, Inc., 800 F.2d 737, 738 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding corporation is
responsible when multiple agents engage in criminal conspiracy on its behalf); United States v.
Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (1st Cir. 1984) (upholding criminal conspiracy convictions of
corporate officers). The court affirmed the convictions despite the fact that the officers were
authorized to perform the acts and intended benefit the corporation because "the corporate veil
does not shield them from criminal liability." Id.; Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d
594, 603 (5th Cir. 198 1) (discussing dangers of conspiracy). The Dussouv court recognized that
"the view of the corporation as a single legal actor becomes a fiction without a purpose" when
"the action by an incorporated collection of individuals creates the 'group danger' at which
conspiracy liability is aimed." Id.; see also Sarah N. Welling, IntracorporatePluralitO, in
Criminal Conspiraci, Law, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1155, 1191 (1982) (noting corporate status not
addressed in cases of corporate criminal conspiracies, despite automatic liability).
8 See cases cited supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing circuit court decisions
refusing to allow intracorporate defense to criminal conspiracies).
84 See generally Welling, supra note 82, at 1191-92 (recognizing lack of courts' reasoning).
The article states in relevant text, "[a]lthough these cases implicitly hold that multiple agents of a
single corporation constitute a plurality, they are unenlightening because the courts do not discuss
the issue." Id.
85 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
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Various other courts have adopted similar simplistic reasoning
concerning the applicability of the doctrine to criminal conspiracies. The
Ninth Circuit even went so far as to state that it was "illogical" to apply the
doctrine to criminal conspiracies because if it were permitted, "no
corporation acting on its own behalf by and through its employees could be
found guilty of conspiracy." 88
It has been suggested that the distinction between corporate
liability in civil and criminal conspiracies lies in the "greater social harm
embodied in the latter."8 9 Courts allow business activity to the extent that it
does not offend public policy, which is obviously violated by a criminal
conspiracy. 90 To counter this argument, however, it has been asserted that
prohibiting the intracorporate conspiracy defense in criminal cases is of
little public policy importance because the corporate entity would have a
greater fear of the "substantive wrongdoing underlying the would-be
conspiracy charge," rather the conspiracy charge itself. 91 Therefore, no
deterrent92 effect is created by prohibiting the defense in criminal conspiracy
claims.
E.

The Special RelationshipBetween 18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C. § 1512,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)

In McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,93 the Eleventh Circuit
recognized that a civil claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), alleging a
conspiracy to deter an individual from testifying in a federal court,
necessarily constitutes criminal activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512
(tampering with a witness) and a criminal conspiracy in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371. 94 The McAndrew court held that just as the intracorporate
86 Id. at 417. The Wise Court determined the fictitious entity created through incorporation is
only "operative to protect officers from contract liability." Id.
87 See United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (ist Cir. 1984). (upholding
convictions of corporate officers involved in a conspiracy); see also United States v. Hartley, 678
F.2d 961,970 (1lth Cir. 1982) (recognizing limits of corporate entity fiction). The court noted
that the fictitious corporate entity "was never intended to prohibit the imposition of criminal
liability by allowing a corporation or its agents to hide behind the identity of the other." Id.
58 United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1994).
89 IntracorporateConspiracies,supra note 3, at 615, n. 11l (theorizing reason for distinction
between civil and criminal conspiracies).
90 See id (explaining public policy concerns).
91 Shaun P. Martin, Intracorporate Conspiracies, 50 STAN. L. REV. 399, 461 (1998)
(discussing deterrent effect, if any, of intracorporate conspiracy protections).
92 See Martin, supra note 91, at 461 (negating idea that prohibition of defense acts as
deterrent).
" 206 F.3d 1031 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
94 Id. at 1035-36; see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) ("two or more persons" cannot conspire to
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conspiracy doctrine cannot shield a criminal conspiracy from prosecution
under the Federal Criminal Code, the doctrine also cannot shield the same
conspiracy, alleging the same criminal wrongdoing, from civil liability
arising under § 1985(2). 95 McAndrew, an employee of Lockheed Martin,
claimed that on the morning before he was scheduled to testify before a
grand jury concerning Lockheed Martin's possible violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, he was contacted by his immediate supervisor, who
told him that it would not be in his best interest to testify.9 6 He was later

compelled by subpoena and court order to testify, and his employment was
subsequently terminated, purportedly due to his job performance. 97
McAndrew filed suit pursuant to § 1985(2).98

The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that the action alleged under
§ 1985(2) also fell within the scope of a criminal conspiracy to tamper with
a witness under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 1512. 99 The court was
then faced with the question of "whether the criminal conspiracy exception
to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine [was] somehow limited to cases in
which the underlying criminal conspiracy arises under 18 U.S.C. § 371
rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). '' oo The court answered this
question in the negative, reasoning that there was no need to differentiate
between the criminal and civil conspiracy statutes because the underlying
conduct being challenged was exactly the same. 10 1 Nevertheless, the
commit any offense against the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000) (the criminal statute
prohibiting tampering with a witness); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (2000) ("two or more persons" cannot
conspire to obstruct justice by intimidating a party, witness, or juror).
95 McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1040-41 (stating case holding).
96 Id. at 1034 (stating case facts).
97 Id.

9' Id. at 1035.
99 Id. at 1037-38 (recognizing circuit precedent in extending doctrine to civil claims under §
1985(3)).
The Eleventh Circuit - formerly the Fifth Circuit - consistently applied the
intracorporate conspiracy defense to claims arising under § 1985(3). See Dickerson v. Alachua
County Comm'n, 200 F.3d 761, 768 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding doctrine barred plaintiffs §
1985(3) claim). Dickerson dealt with a claim alleging a conspiracy among employees of a public
entity to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights. Id. at 763; see also Chambliss v. Foote, 562 F.2d
1015, 1015 (5th Cir. 1977) (affirming intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred § 1985(3) claim).
Chambliss involved a plaintiffs claim that a university decision not to renew her teaching
contract was the result of a conspiracy to violate her civil rights. Chambliss v. Foote, 421 F.Supp.
12, 14 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd 562 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1977). The McAndrew court, however,
drew a distinction between § 1985(2) and § 1985(3) claims, and refused to allow the defense to
claims arising under § 1985(2). McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1041.
100McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1040 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating
issue before the court).
101 Id.at 1041 (explaining court's reasoning). The court stated:
Because, the underlying conspiratorial conduct being challenged is precisely the same
regardless of whether a criminal conspiracy is alleged under § 371 or under § 1985(2),
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reasoning provided by the Eleventh Circuit fails to adequately address why
a distinction exists between corporate civil and criminal conspiratorial
liability.
III. ANALYSIS

A.

Eleventh Circuit Distinction

The Eleventh Circuit takes a unique and logical approach to
distinguishing between § 1985(2) and § 1985(3) claims. 10 2 All other
circuits have failed to draw a distinction between § 1985(2) and § 1985(3)
claims, but rather, have chosen to either extend or refuse to extend the
intracorporate conspiracy defense to civil conspiracy claims arising under §
1985 as a whole. 10 3 The Eleventh Circuit was the first and only court to
agree with the majority of circuits in extending the intracorporate
conspiracy defense to claims arising under
§ 1985(3), but refusing to
°4
extend it to claims arising under § 1985(2).
The McAndrew court recognized its own precedent in extending
conspiracy doctrine to claims arising under § 1985(3).105
intracorporate
the
The court, however, rejected the application of this precedent to McAndrew
because none of the prior cases "involved a claim brought under § 1985(2)
and ... neither involved allegations of a criminal conspiracy to deter by
force, intimidation,
or threat an individual from testifying before a federal
10 6
grand jury."

Instead, the court focused its analysis on the long-recognized
there is no reason to differentiate between the criminal and civil conspiracy statutes. In
either case, when a criminal conspiracy is alleged, the underlying conduct is of a sort
that neither the corporate entity fiction nor the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was
intended or used to shield.
Id
102Id. at 1038 (recognizing need to provide different analysis). The court asserted, "[w]e
have no occasion to revisit [precedent § 1985(3) cases] today because neither case addressed the
precise question presented here: whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies to and
bars claims alleging a criminal conspiracy among corporate officers and the corporation itself
arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)." Id.
103 See supra notes 44 and 49 and accompanying text (explaining holdings of various
circuits).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 93-95 (distinguishing holding and reasoning between
§ 1985(2) and § 1985(3) claims).
1o5See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting history of circuit precedent).
106 McAndrew v. Lockeed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1038, 1041 (11th Cir. 2000)
(distinguishing issue at bar from prior issues presented to the court).
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exception to the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to
criminal conspiracies under 18 U.S.C. § 371.107 The plaintiffs allegation
of a conspiracy to deter an individual from testifying in a federal court by
force, intimidation, or threat also alleges criminal activity in violation of
the criminal statute prohibiting witness tampering, and a criminal
conspiracy in violation of § 371.08 Accordingly, the 11th Circuit found
that "the criminal conspiracy exception to the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine applies regardless of whether the criminal conspiracy arises under
18 U.S.C. § 371 or under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. '"109 This unique and logical
analysis has yet to be adopted by any other court.'(
Failureof Other Circuits to Draw Such a Distinction

B.

If the majority of circuits fail to recognize the many arguments
against allowing the intracorporate conspiracy defense in civil claims, these
same courts should at least consider the distinction made by the Eleventh
Circuit in McAndrew and hold that the doctrine is barred in § 1985(2)
claims.' " All circuits that have addressed the issue have held that the
corporate entity fiction was neither intended nor used to shield criminal
conspiratorial conduct. 1 2 As such, these courts refuse to apply
the
3
intracorporate conspiracy exception to criminal conspiracy claims."
Despite a uniform holding regarding criminal conspiracy claims,
no court other than the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that in § 1985(2)
claims, the underlying conspiratorial conduct is exactly the same whether

See supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (explaining consistency of holding doctrine's
inapplicability to criminal conspiracies).
10X See supra note 99 and accompanying text (recognizing parallel between alleged
107

underlying conduct). The McAndrew court found "'no basis" for the distinction between cases in
which the underlying criminal conspiracy arises under 18 U.S.C. § 371 rather than under 42
U.S.C. § 1985. McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1040. The court recognized that "both the rationale for
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and the legislative history of § 1985(2) counsel in favor of
a consistent application of the criminal conspiracy exception . . . regardless of whether the
criminal conspiracy arises under the federal criminal or civil code." Id.
109 See McAndrew. 206 F.3d at 1040-41 (stating court's holding).
See intra Part Ill(B).
See cases cited supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining circuit holdings in
regards to intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as applied to civil conspiracy claims). The Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have all allowed the intracorporate
defense to civil conspiracy claims. Id.; see alo', McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1035-41 (summarizing
facts, reasoning, and holding of case).
I2 See supra Part II(D) (detailing courts' refusal to extend the doctrine to criminal
conspiracies).
113 See supra Part II(D) (detailing courts' refusal to extend the doctrine to criminal
conspiracies).
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alleged criminally under § 371 or civilly under § 1985(2).'14 Accordingly,
there is no reason to differentiate between the two when determining
corporate liability because "the underlying conduct is of a sort that neither
the corporate entity fiction nor the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was
intended or used to shield."'1 5 Nevertheless, all other courts have failed to
draw a distinction between § 1985(2) and § 1985(3) claims.' 1 6 In circuits
that have considered both types of claims, the same reasoning is applied to
the extension of or refusal to extend the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine.117 This lack of distinction is illogical and troublesome, and thus
should be addressed by the various circuit courts.
Lingering Inconsistencies

C.

The reasoning provided by the Eleventh Circuit and neglected by
all other circuits fails to adequately address why a distinction exists
In
between corporate civil and criminal conspiratorial liability." 8
McAndrew, the Eleventh Circuit draws a logical conclusion based upon its
prior ruling that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is not applicable in
criminal cases, and that a certain provision of the civil conspiracy statute
imposes liability for the same underlying conduct." 9 No other circuits,
however, have addressed this issue and have simply accepted the premise
that there is an inherent distinction between criminal and civil corporate
conspiratorial liability.1 20 Courts have reasoned that the doctrine was not
intended to shield criminal behavior.' 2 1 If this reasoning is the sole basis
for the distinction, however, it logically follows that the doctrine was also
not intended to shield corporations from conspiring to violate one's civil
122
rights, whether the conspiracy be alleged under § 1985(2) or § 1985(3).
114 See McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1040-41 (11th Cir. 2000)
(recounting holding in regard to the underlying conspiratorial conduct).
ld.
I at 1041.
116See supra notes 44 and 49 and accompanying text (listing circuit decisions).
117 See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text (outlining circuit holdings and reasoning
regarding civil conspiracies arising under § 1985).
118 See McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1038-41.
The Eleventh Circuit noticed the differences
between previous holdings regarding the distinction between civil and criminal corporate
conspiratorial liability, but did not address the basis for such a distinction. See id.
119 See id.
I'

See Welling, supra note 82 at 1191-92 (noting "unenlightening"

nature of courts'

reasoning).
121 See supra text accompanying notes 81-88 (explaining why intracorporate doctrine does
not apply to criminal conspiracies).
122See supra text accompanying notes 81-88 (explaining why intracorporate doctrine does
not apply to criminal conspiracies); see also supra notes 49, 63-80 and accompanying text
(outlining "intent" argument).
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Consequently, it is illogical and inconsistent for circuit courts to
refuse to extend the intracorporate conspiracy defense in criminal
conspiracies, but to allow it for civil conspiracies.1 23 If the "intent" of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is the sole basis for the refusal to extend
the doctrine to criminal conspiracies, then it should also be inapplicable to
civil conspiracy claims filed pursuant to § 1985, regardless of whether they
are alleged under § 1985(2) or § 1985(3).124 Thus, the same arguments set
forth by the First, Third and Tenth Circuits in their refusals to extend the
doctrine125to civil conspiracies should apply consistently to all conspiracy
claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is a judicial rule that is
inconsistently applied among civil and criminal conspiracy claims. The
Eleventh Circuit recognized that it is illogical to shield corporations from
liability under a civil statute that addresses the same conduct subjecting
corporations to criminal conspiratorial liability. Despite this important
recognition, however, the Eleventh Circuit has made no more progress than
the majority of circuits that have illogically allowed the application of the
intracorporate conspiracy defense in civil conspiracies, but not in criminal
conspiracies. These circuits refuse to extend the defense in such situations
simply because the doctrine, when it was created and subsequently adopted
by the various courts, was not "intended" to shield corporations from
liability for such behavior. If the doctrine's original intent is the sole basis
for such a distinction, then these courts should also hold that it is
inapplicable to civil claims because the doctrine was initially intended for
use in an antitrust context. The doctrine was subsequently applied to other
types of conspiracy claims by the various circuit courts, but without
extensive discussion regarding the extended application. All circuit courts
123 Compare cases cited supra note 44 (examining circuit holdings and applicability of
doctrine to civil conspiracies) with cases cited supra note 82 (examining circuit holdings that the
doctrine does not apply to criminal conspiracies).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 81-88 (explaining why intracorporate doctrine does
not apply to criminal conspiracies); see also supra notes 49, 63-80 and accompanying text
(outlining "intent" argument). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was developed in an
antitrust context "to allow one corporation to take actions that two corporations could not agree to
do." Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining
doctrine's original purpose). When addressing criminal conspiracies, the Supreme Court refused
to extend the doctrinal defense, stating "the fiction of corporate entity ... has never been applied
as a shield against criminal prosecutions." United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 417 (1962).
125 See supra note 49 and Part Ili(B)(3) (explaining reasoning of First, Third, and Tenth
Circuits).
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refuse to extend the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to criminal claims
simply because the doctrine was not intended for use as a defense to these
claims. Conversely, however, the majority of circuit courts allow the
intracorporate conspiracy defense in civil conspiracy claims, regardless of
the intent argument. Such inconsistencies must be addressed by the various
circuit courts of appeals in order to prevent the doctrine from being abused
in ways for which it was never intended. The existing distinction between
civil and criminal corporate and conspiratorial liability must be
reconsidered in order for the doctrine's original intent to be realized and to
provide consistency in its application by the courts.
Katy 0 'Lean'

